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Plotinus and St. John of the Cross: 
Concurrences and Divergencies 
We propose to examine here two renowned champions of mysticism, Plotinus 
and St. John of the Cross. The former, the third-century Greek philosopher 
from Alexandria in northern Egypt, is the father of Neoplatonism. The latter, 
the sixteenth-century Castilian Carmelite, is known as reformer of his order, as 
theologian, as mystic, and as sublime poet of divine love. 
Both figures can be described, above all and specifically, as mystics: that is, 
as practitioners of mysticism and, at the same time, as theoreticians of mysti-
cism. There is shared by both one dominating concern and objective: 
personal, experiential union with the transcendent Other, with the Absolute. 
For both, furthermore, this concern is positively central to their writings, as it 
was central to their historical lives. We propose to compare their respective 
understandings of mysticism, beginning with their striking points in common 
and continuing with their more subtle and more profound divergencies. 
To begin with the most fundamental notions, both thinkers postulate or 
believe in a Transcendent Other, an Absolute: for Plotinus, the One, to hen; 
for John of the Cross, the God of Christian Revelation. It is this that is the 
supreme reality, the cause of the universe, and the goal to which all things 
aspire. Both mystics stress certain characteristics of this ultimate reality: that 
it is one, simple, absolute, other, and, perhaps most importantly, transcendent. 
The postulation of these qualities as divine attributes is to be expected in St. 
John of the Cross, who falls squarely within the Judeo-Christian tradition. In 
the case of Plotinus, however, the notion of the transcendence of the One 
represents a surpassing of previous Greek ontology; 1 at the same time, it sepa-
rates him from a number of schools of Eastern mysticism and from any 
doctrine based upon purely pantheistic foundations. Thus this notion of the 
transcendence of the supreme reality joins Plotinus and John of the Cross in 
somewhat of a common tradition, while at the same time it separates them 
sharply from a host of other forms of mysticism. 
The next key notion on which these two thinkers should be compared is that 
of the visible universe. In both it is conceived as derived from the transcen-
dent Absolute in some way, whether by emanation or by creation, and as such 
it is a reflection, however remote, of the perfections of the Absolute. In Ploti-
nus' view, all things in the visible universe, the kosmos aisthetos, are formed 
according to archetypes which belong to the Intelligible Universe, the Nom, 
the sphere or dimension of the forms. 2 Material beings are only images of 
their immensely more perfect archetypes, or logoi. However, the beauty of the 
physical cosmos, as well as that of art, can serve as a starting point for the 
uplifting and awakening of the soul, that it may gradually ascend, by moving 
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from image to archetype, to the contemplation of intelligible forms and their 
beauty. Though there are a number of differences to be found, an exemplarist 
understanding of creation, derived in part from Platonic and Neoplatonic 
sources, came to be the common property of most medieval Christian theolo-
gians. Exemplarist motifs thus make their appearance in a chain of thinkers, 
being transmitted through such mystics as St. Augustine and Dionysius the 
Pseudo-Areopagite, continuing to Sts. Francis and Bonaventure, arriving at 
last to post-Renaissance John of the Cross. Not unlike his predecessors in the 
medieval mystical tradition, John exclaims that creatures may be looked upon 
"as a trace of the passing of God, whereby one can discern His grandeur, 
power, and wisdom."3 And again, like both Plotinus and his more proximate 
Christian predecessors, John of the Cross turns towards the wonder and 
beauty of creatures as a means of being uplifted to the contemplation of 
higher realities. The soul that wishes to advance in knowledge of God, he tells 
us, must begin "by knowing and reflecting upon creatures, moving from these 
to the knowledge of its Beloved, their Creator. For ... His grandeur and 
excellence are known through them." 4 
It is also appropriate that we compare the concept of the human soul in 
both thinkers. Following Aristotle, the one as well as the other understands it 
as the form of the body, as the vivifier of human malter. At the same time, 
both consider it to be, as in Plato, immaterial and immortal. There are still 
further points of commonality: both have been influenced by the Aristotelian 
doctrine that the human mind becomes what it knows, which is the basis for 
the conclusion that it has the capacity to assimilate any and all things.S In 
Plotinus, this notion combines with the Stoic doctrine that the soul has the 
ability to stretch itself boundlessly over the All, giving rise to the theory of the 
"infinite self," according to which the individual soul can ascend to and assim-
ilate the infinite contents of the Nous, the Intelligible World, or second 
hypostasis, and even achieve union with the One.6 The sixteenth-century 
Spanish mystic, for his part, stresses that the human soul is characterized by a 
certain elasticity by which different levels of interiority and spiritual receptivity 
may be progressively actualized. In both thinkers the soul has unequivocally 
one destiny, which is also its salvation: union with the transcendent Other, or 
God. In Plot in us, in the words of one of his analysts, "the soul is an amphib-
ian, a traveller [that] re-ascends through the power of dialectic to Intellect and 
then by a process of purification, of utter simplification, arrives at the point of 
contact with the pure and simple absolute, the One."7 In language not totally 
foreign to this, the Spanish Carmelite describes the soul as a pilgrim in the 
night: "[In1 order that the soul may reach the state of perfection," he writes, 
"it must ordinarily undergo first two types of nights, which spiritual writers call 
purgations or purifications of the soul. And here we call them nights, because 
the soul, in the one as well as in the other, walks along in darkness, as at night. 
The first night or purgation is that of the sensitive part of the soul ... and the 
second is of the spiritual part ... ."8 In some of his texts, the metaphorical 
night is extended to include a third part, which is the term of the ascent: 
"These three parts of the night all constitute one night; but it has three parts 
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like the night, because the first, which is the night of sense, is compared to the 
evening twilight ... and the second, which is [the virtue ofl faith, is compared 
to midnight, which is totally dark; and the third, which is [the experience of] 
God, is compared to dawn .... "9 
In both of the eminent mystics the objective is to bring the soul to union 
with its transcendent source; and in both, likewise, the means to this end is an 
arduous process of purification. Such a purification, which is central to any 
doctrine of mysticism, is the next notion we must compare. Both of them 
conceive of it as an ascent, a spiritual and mental movement from below 
upwards, and from the contemplation of multiplicity to that of unity. The 
ascent, at least in one of its dimensions, consists in a purification of the intel-
lectual operations by progressive negations, in order that the perfections and 
the utter simplicity of the source of being may be revealed. Interestingly, 
though, both the pagan sage and the Christian saint insist that the ascent 
cannot be exclusively intellectual but must be moral as well, that it requires 
virtues and the achievement of moral perfections. Both thinkers acknowledge 
the four cardinal virtues as foundational, to be supplemented or crowned by a 
set of higher ones: in Plot in us, the same four cardinal virtues, no longer at the 
"civic" but rather at the "purificative" level, the practice of which brings about 
detachment from bodily illusions; in John of the Cross, the supernatural and 
infused virtues of faith, hope, and charity. Again, in both mystics the element 
of love is considered indispensable. Some force must impel the soul; some-
thing must move it forward on this rigorous ascent. In Plotinus the love in 
question is termed eros, often translated as either "yearning" or "desire"; the 
soul receives this love from the One and is in turn transformed, elevated, and 
brought by the One to a similarity with it. The Christian mystic John of the 
Cross, on the other hand, distinguishes between a natural passion for commu-
nion with God, which may be cultivated by choice and which would probably 
correspond to the Plotinian eros, and the supernatural love of charity derived 
from the theological virtue of the same name. While the first form of love 
plays a preparatory role, it is the second love that effects the actual union of 
the soul with God. Both these mystics, moreover, divide the ascent or process 
of purification into various stages. Some striking parallels can be discerned in 
their respective schema. In that of Plotinus, the ascent comprises three stages: 
1) the overcoming of bodily sensations and desires, by which the state of 
impassibility, or apatheia, is achieved; 2) the suppression of discursive reason-
ing - that is, of all ratiocination and any cognitive operations involving the 
imagination; and 3) the surpassing of intelligible form, or the intuitive leap 
from the Ideas in their diversity to the One in its unity. Plotinus' first stage 
would correspond very clearly to John of the Cross' "active night of sense," in 
which fundamentally the same goals are achieved. The last two stages in 
Plotinus' development would both fall within what the Spanish mystic calls the 
"active night: of spirit," in which the three powers of the soul- intellect, mem-
ory, and will-are purified simultaneously and in stages by negation of their 
objects. 
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There are also some striking coincidences to be remarked in the matter of 
the mystical union itself. In both expositors, the soul and the Absolute 
"become one"; not, however, by any ontological fusion of the two subjects, nor 
by absorption of the human into the divine, such as two ethereal bodies might 
be united. Rather, mystical communion is explained far more subtly as a one-
ness achieved in the intentional order by means of acts of knowing and loving, 
and in particular through a cognitive act of intuition. Thus, if in this experi-
ence the soul "becomes" God or the Absolute, it is in the sense that the object 
known determines the knowing subject intentionally by permeation of the 
faculties. Both thinkers are indebted in their formulation of this phenomenon 
to Aristotelian psychology, in which the mind has the capacity to become what 
it knows. lO Another central characteristic in both articulations, the Plotinian 
and the Sanjuanist, is that mystical union does not entail the loss of the soul's 
self as a knowing and willing subject. It is particularly important to point this 
out concerning Plotinus, who, not being a Christian, might be associated with 
pantheistic forms of mysticism in which the highest level of achievement brings 
about an annihilation or loss of self. In Plotinus, however, a metaphysical 
identification of being and knowledge allows for the retention of the individual 
knowing substance and the simultaneous intentional presence to it of differing 
entities. In John of the Cross, similarly, to be human is to have a soul 
endowed with the rational faculties of intellect, memory, and will. These 
powers are never absorbed by any other subject nor eradicated in their opera-
tions; in mystical rapture, far to the contrary, they are elevated to unprece· 
dented operative heights. It is also an interesting coincidence that both com· 
mentators consider the mystical experience to have two dimensions, a cogni· 
tive one and an affective one. As Plotinus says in the Enneads (VI, 7, 35), in 
that divine trance the soul is at once sober and inebriated. Or, in Juan de la 
Cruz's formulation, the ray of infused contemplation "is like a warm light ... 
for it is an illumination that enamors jointly. . .. For, since God is divine light 
and love, in the communication that He makes of Himself to the soul, He 
equally informs the two powers, intellect and will, with knowledge and love." 11 
The two outstanding mystics should be compared on one last fundamental 
issue: the use of metaphors. It is commonplace among mystics of all cultures 
to insist upon the otherness and ineffability of their peculiar experience. See-
ing, however, that things of beauty from the physical cosmos are images or 
reflections of the more perfect beyond, they find that metaphors can convey 
adequately, though obliquely, something of their unfathomable venture. Both 
Plotinus and John of the Cross are masters of the use of metaphors, and they 
both employ them in passages overflowing with lyrical intensity. Plotinus 
resorts to them especially to convey the strength and splendor of spiritual 
realities: an example would be his statement that "the material universe floats 
in Soul like a net in the sea."12 Juan de 11:1 Cruz, on the other hand, who is 
recognized as the most sublime and excellent poet of the Spanish language, 
builds his lyrics around a cluster of essential symbols: the hunt, the nuptials, 
the night, the dawn, the flame, the fountain in the garden. Each one of these 
archetypal realities he utilizes to represent the union of the soul with God, or 
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the presence of God within the soul. Interestingly, there is no lack of 
metaphors shared by the two mystics: from terms used in passing - such as 
"vision," "contemplation," and "ecstasy" - to such central and sustained 
images as that of the "ascent," used to illustrate the road to union, and that of 
the "awakening" of the soul ("recuerdo" in John of the Cross), used to express 
its achievement. In their common insistence upon the need for purification 
and detachment of the will, there is a noticeable affinity in their formulation of 
negative imperatives: while Plotinus concludes the Enneads V, 3 with his 
categorical "Cut away everything," the treatises of the Spanish saint resound 
with his emphatic "Nada, nada, nada .... " 
The parallels are, no doubt, striking. Closer analysis will reveal, however, 
that the approximation to Plotinus in the Spanish mystic represents more of a 
conceptual and symbolic framework than a true coincidence in the manner of 
understanding the essence of mysticism and its achievement. Despite the 
palpable resemblances, it is safe to say that John of the Cross should not be 
looked upon principally as a Christian Neoplatonist. 
Next we shall confront the two doctrines in search of the divergencies. 
Following the order we have established, we shall examine the disparities in 
the concepts of God or the Absolute, the universe, the human being, the 
purification or ascent, and the mystical union. 
When speaking of the Absolute in Plotinus, one must distinguish between 
the One, or first hypostasis, and its primal product, the Nous, Logos, or second 
hypostasis. The One, or the Good (a name derived from Plato), is conceived 
of by Plotinus not only as transcendent but as beyond being. It is also beyond 
form, and therefore totally indeterminate. It is a reality more negative than 
positive, more logical than ontological. Against Aristotle, who made the 
divine intellect the first principle, Plotinus asserts that in the One there is no 
consciousness or intellection; this is so, he maintains, because the One in its 
absolute simplicity must be beyond the dichotomy of subject and object. The 
first product of the One, the Nous, is the divine intellect, the world or sphere 
of the forms. It is the realm of the divine properly speaking, for the One is 
beyond divinity. The Nous is inferior to the One, following the law of dimin-
ishing causality that governs the emanationist universe of Plotinus. However, 
many of the attributes denied of the One are affirmed of the Nous. The 
second hypostasis is an ontologically positive reality: it is being, being at its 
highest. It is specified by form, and it contains the forms or logoi or intelligible 
archetypes for all inferior realities. The Nous is alive with cognitive activity, 
for being is one with intellection; it is the sphere of the divinities, a host of 
individual knowing subjects cognitively present to one another. Needless to 
say, this Plotinian emanationist cosmos with its proliferation of divinities has 
little to do with the triune Christian God of St. John of the Cross. Ironically, 
though, there may be some historical link between the understanding of the 
one and thilt of the other, for early Christian Neoplatonists were influenced by 
Plotinus' thought on the One and its derivatives in their reflections upon the 
divine processions and the Trinity. One such speculator was fourth-century 
Marius Victorinus, whose thought was later improved upon by his con tempo-
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rary St. Augustine. At any rate, in the Christian theologian John of the Cross, 
God is not beyond being; He is, rather, the fullness of being. He is not merely 
logical, but metaphysically positive as well; He is infinite, but not indetermi-
nate; He is omniscient and ever-conscious. In the manner of generation there 
is some remote resemblance with Plotinus, for in both bodies of thought the 
first procession from the Absolute is occasioned by an act of contemplative 
intellection, and that which proceeds - in Plotinus, the Nous; in the Carmelite 
theologian, the second trinitarian Person - is in its very essence intellective. 
However, the Christian God does not generate His inferior, but rather eter-
nally generates and spirates His equal. It is when He creates "ex nihilo" that 
He produces something inferior. 
This leads us to the divergencies in the two authors regarding the under-
standing of the visible or created universe. Plotinus stresses that the One is 
transcendent. However, as all things emanate from it through a chain of 
descending hypostases, there is a certain continuity between the higher and 
the lower. Each hypostasis is significantly inferior to the prior; nonetheless, 
there is no sharp ontological break in the entire descent. For this reason, 
along the descending chain, the lower contains the higher in some latent or 
virtual mode. In the depths, there is a kinship and a substantial identity 
between the human soul and the higher cosmic realities. The One, Plotinus 
tells us, "holds sway by all reason over a dense offspring of its own, a host that 
shares its divinity."13 This explains how knowledge of the divine is possible: it 
is contained by the soul virtually or latently. In John of the Cross, on the other 
hand, God creates "ex nihilo," and this very concept grounds a radical dispro-
portionality between God and creatures. The consequence of this, looking at 
it "from above," is that in John of the Cross-to put it simply-God is far 
more transcendent than in Plotinus. And looking at it "from below," it means 
that the essence of created things does not contain even virtually or seminally 
a share in God's nature; the human being is nol divine. The discontinuity 
carries over into the realm of human knowledge: as creatures are dispropor-
tionate to God, likewise human cognition in terms of creatures, no matter how 
lofty, is disproportionate to God. Much unlike Plotinus, John of the Cross 
insists that one cannot know God or become united with Him by the operation 
of one's cognitive faculties as they are given in nature. 
Moving on to the structure of human nature, for Plotinus man is composed 
of two distinct entities: body and soul. More than a composite, the human 
being is an ensemble built in layers. Souls pre-exist their existence in time. 
They dwell in and are part of the third hypostasis: psyche, Universal Soul. The 
higher part of the soul participates in Nous, or Intellect, although it has the 
capacity to descend to lower hypostases. Due to a certain "original sin" com-
mitted by some souls, there is a "fall" to the sensible world. The soul then 
informs matter. Its union with a particular body, however, is rather accidental; 
for it has the capacity, at another moment in time, to inform another one. 
Nonetheless, it is only the lower part of the soul which thus "falls"; the higher 
part continues to dwell permanently within the third hypostasis, having no 
contact with the sensible; the lower soul, or the body. Structurally, therefore, 
Plotinus and St. John of the Cross 185 
the human being is built on two different planes. First there is the "true self," 
the contemplative and rational part, which is perpetually illuminated by Intel-
lect and not involved in temporal life; this self cannot suffer, sin, or be igno-
rant. Then there is the "other self," formed by the bodily organism. An irra-
diation from the higher soul, this self is in communication with the sensible 
world; it suffers passions and ignorance, and it dwells in its body as in a prison. 
Our sixteenth-century Carmelite would find this description of the human 
being almost unrecognizable. In matters pertaining to philosophical anthro-
pology, John of the Cross was fundamentally Aristotelian, having studied the 
Stagirite both directly and through Thomas Aquinas. Historically, this is not at 
all surprising, given that he received his intellectual formation at the Univer-
sity of Salamanca in the decade of the 1560's, the heyday of the Silver Age of 
Scholasticism. For Juan de la Cruz, there is no pre-existence, transmigration, 
or reincarnation of souls. The soul is the substantial form of one particular 
body. Further, body and soul constitute a composite, or a unity in one sup-
posit. 14 Body and soul are components of an integrated whole. The soul 
dwells in and with the body, in isolation from which it cannot operate. It is not 
empowered to think or contemplate independently; nor can it effect a meta-
physical or mystical flight of its own. Being a spiritual substance in which there 
are neither higher nor lower parts, the entire soul is in communion with the 
body it informs; being, further, the seat or principle of the composite's rational 
operations, the soul is in immediate contact with all things perceived, known, 
remembered, or desired by the subject. In John of the Cross the soul is a 
markedly historical and incarnate reality and never ceases to be so. Some 
might think this anthropology to be antagonistic to mystical ascent. We will 
see, however, that this thinker does reconcile this anthropology with mystical 
theology. 
For now, though, let us focus upon the understanding of human knowledge 
in Plotinus and in John of the Cross, particularly since the two agree that 
mystical union takes place in the intentional order. In Plotinus' view, the 
highest degree of cognitive activity is that of contemplation of the forms and 
intellectual principles. The higher portion of the soul performs this activity of 
its own accord, by virtue of its kinship with the Nous, or Universal Intellect. 15 
The subsequently lower level of noetic activity is that of rational or discursive 
reasoning. It is performed by a correspondingly lower portion of the soul, that 
called the rational soul, which belongs to the realm of psyche, or Universal 
Soul. It has derived its intellectual principles from the Nous; but being lesser 
in perfection, its cognitive act is no longer contemplative or intuitive but 
discursive. 16 At the lowest level of cognitive operations lie the activities of 
perception and memory. These two are seen as acts of the soul, as operations 
set in motion and radiating forth from it, and not as impressions received from 
its objects.l7 According to Plotinus' epistemology, then, in the order of oper-
ations the initiative always comes from above, by a higher portion of the soul 
illuminating a lower one. The One, the Nous, the Universal Soul are con-
stantly shedding their rays of illumination upon our individual souls, a fact 
186 Plotinus and St. John of the Cross 
which we discover in philosophical reflection. Our knowledge always comes 
from above and from within; in no way is it derived from sense perception. 
This entire schema is virtually inverted in John of the Cross' view of human 
cognition. His psychology of knowledge is Aristotelian in its basic contours. 
As such, sensation sets in motion the cognitive process, and all subsequent 
noetic operations are dependent upon it: "As the philosophers say, the soul, 
when God infuses it into the body, is like a smooth, blank tablet upon which 
nothing is painted; and, except for that which it experiences through the 
senses, nothing is communicated to it, in the course of nature, from any other 
source."18 In the process of cognition, perception leads to the production of 
phantasms or sensible images, which are indispensable for the operations of 
the intellect.19 The active intellect then abstracts the intelligible form from 
the sensible image, which in turn activates and informs the passive intellect. It 
is this latter faculty that performs the actions of intellection and judgment 
properly speaking. We are dealing here with an understanding of knowledge 
in which the process of cognition begins outside the person and then proceeds 
to move inward and upward. It is an epistemology which does not admit any 
form of innatism and which, while recognizing the mind's infinite capacity to 
know, holds that it can have no fully imageless, formless thoughts. Here again, 
John of the Cross' philosophical positions would seem to preclude any cogni-
tive experience of a mystical nature. 
Turning to the question of the mystical ascent to God, we shall see that here 
the divergencies become even more pronounced. In Plotinus the process of 
purification, or katharsis, is essentially dialectical, coming about by means of 
gradual suppressions of intelligible differences until the soul at last attains the 
simplicity and unity of the One. It is an ascent effected by metaphysical 
knowledge and thus barred from those individuals unable to obtain this partic-
ular intellectual discipline; nonphilosophers, in fact, are precluded from 
reaching any of the three highest hypostases - Universal Soul, the Nous, or the 
One. Further, this ascent is brought about by an introvertive reflective gaze, 
which seeks to discover in the depths of the self the divinity that is latently 
present. In Plotinus' words, "The soul once seen to be thus precious, thus 
divine, you may hold the faith by its possession you are already nearing God: 
in the strength of this power make upwards toward Him: at no great distance 
you must attain: there is not much between."20 In another passage: "To find 
ourselves is to know our source."21 This introvertive motion is at once a rever-
sion-a return to one's principle-and, since the principle is superior, an 
elevation. A direct and fundamental consequence is that in Plotinus no prac-
tice of religion is involved or necessary, or even recommended. There are no 
prayers, no sacraments, no rituals. This stems in part from the soul/body 
dichotomy, in which the actions of the latter have absolutely no impact upon 
the former. It is also rooted in the self-sufficicm.:y and essential divinity of the 
soul. As Paul Henry formulated it, 
(In PlotinusJ salvation is not to be achieved. It is achieved. For its realization it is enough 
that one should become conscious of what one already is in one's inmost nature, where 
Inlellt'(1 whkh is ""yond llie vinut's idenlifies ilself with true being and with the idea which 
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one forms of the self, of the world, and of God. The anchoritism of the soul and of God 
exclude at once all sacramentalism and all true history of becoming. The latent actuality of 
salvation and the cold transcendence of God make it impossible, in· terms of Plotinian 
Socratism, to conceive of any genuine doctrine of grace. 22 
This citation certainly introduces the contrast which we must proceed to 
make. In John of the Cross, introvertive reflection and self-knowledge are 
definitely indispensable, but they are only preparatory disciplinary exercises. 
The object of the ascent is not the self. It is unquestionably other, another: it 
is God. However, as there is an ontological abyss between the human being 
and God, the latter is not accessible to the former in one's natural state; more 
specifically, one's rational faculties cannot attain God as an object of their 
operations. In the order of nature, no amount of reflection or thought or even 
meditation can yield the slightest glimpse of God in His true essence. God can 
be attained only in the supernatural order, as a supernatural object and by 
supernatural means. The means is grace, which is merited by Christ and 
distributed sacramentally. Thus we see that for John of the Cross, not only is 
mysticism inherently bound up with religious faith, it is intrinsically Christo-
centric and sacramental as well. We ascend towards our mystical destiny by 
means of prayer, natural and supernatural virtues, the sacraments, grace. 
We have seen that in Plotinus mystical ascent is essentially cognitive. In the 
mysticism of John of the Cross the role of the noetic is no less important, but it 
is more complex and somewhat paradoxical. The term of mystical ascent is 
unquestionably the contemplative vision of God; in beatitude this intuitive 
gaze will be fullest and clearest, while the cognitive act at the summit of the 
mystical union in time is an image of that higher fruition. 23 The ascent, 
however, is not realized by any form of natural knowledge, nor by any 
academic discipline or "science," not even that of theOlogy. In fact, the 
content of these various bodies of human knowledge must be implacably 
denied as means of union with God. For "anything that the imagination can 
conceive and the intellect can grasp and understand in this life is not and 
cannot be the proximate means for union with God. . .. For all that the intel-
lect ... can understand ... is most unlike Him .... "24 The only available 
means for bridging the chasm are the theological virtues; they are effective by 
reason of being supernatural and having proportionality with the end. In the 
order of the actual operations, the communion between the soul and God is 
initiated by the virtue of faith and is perfected and completed by the remaining 
theological virtues of charity and hope. The infused virtue of (aith makes the 
object present to the intellect and communicates it to the soul supernaturally: 
faith "gives and communicates God Himself to us, hidden beneath a silvery 
surface .... "25 What is called (or, then, is an "affirmation of all the powers ... 
in pure faith,"26 which is "the sale proximate and proportionate means for the 
soul to be united with God ... ; and therefore, the greater is the faith in the 
soul, the more closely it is united to God."27 The essence of the faith is in 
itself infinite in luminosity and intelligibility. However, and here lies one of 
the paradoxes, it is "a dark night to the soul,"28 due to "our weak intellects, 
which become darkened and frustrated in so vast a light."29 The subject is 
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admonished to proceed under the exclusive guidance of the light of faith, 
which means to proceed in darkness. "Faith... contains within itself the 
divine light."30 Thus, by augmenting the amount of supernatural faith and by 
dispelling all disproportionate semblances of God, the ray of infused contem-
plation becomes visible, the object of faith becomes progressively manifest to 
the intellect. Self-imposed darkness leads to light; the night of faith leads to 
the dawn of mystical illumination. 
Earlier we spoke of John of the Cross' "epistemological realism," his theory 
of knowledge in which sensation is the first step of the knowing process and in 
which all cognition is tied to phantasms. He is able to maintain such a position 
while affirming also the reality of mystical knowledge because mystical noetic 
acts are infused and therefore extraordinary. Interestingly, though, the 
numerous forms of "supernatural apprehensions of the intellect" which he 
discusses in his treatises are carefully detailed and explained within the frame-
work of his realist theory of knowledge. 31 Typically, infused acts of knowledge 
are explicated in terms of suspension of the lower stages of the cognitive 
process while the integrity of the remaining stages is retained and respected. 
An infused communication might, for example, be made directly to the inter-
nal senses of fantasy and imagination, bypassing the external senses. Once this 
extraordinary apprehension is received, the process of knowledge follows its 
normal course. The internal powers confect a "sensible species," from which 
the active intellect abstracts an "intelligible species," which is then understood 
by the passive intellect; the content of the apprehension is retained in memory 
and is subject to recall, as in ordinary knowledge. An immensely more perfect 
supernatural communication might be made, free of images, directly to the 
passive intellect; in this case all the lower stages of the cognitive process-
external and internal perception, the formation of phantasms, and the opera-
tion of the active intellect-would be bypassed. The highest mystical commu-
nications take place in this way, from pure spirit to pure spirit, "stripped of 
accidents and phantasms."32 
Finally, we must point to some central divergencies in the notion of the 
mystical union itself. In Plotinus' presentation the summit of mystical realiza-
tion appears as an experience which is beyond any and all virtues. Even at the 
lower stages of existence, neither virtue nor vice affects the soul intrinsically; 
the function of virtue, at most, is to remove accretions which have accidentally 
accrued to it. At the apex of mystical union there is no virtuous action, only 
contemplation: for the Good or One itself is beyond virtue. A particular irony 
of Plotinus' doctrine is that despite the fact that the ascent is dialectical and 
cognitive, the highest pinnacle of mystical experience is bereft of conscious-
ness. Within his mystical schema, when the level of contemplation reached is 
that of the Nous, which is Intellection itself, the soul is fully conscious; it is 
experiencing, indeed, the plenitude of cognitive activity. This degree of 
contemplation tends to be the resting place bf mystical souls, both during their 
lifetime and after death. However, in those rare, fleeting moments in which 
the soul attains union with the One, the experience is devoid of consciousness. 
Emphatically he states that "the Principle transcending Being has no intellec-
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tual act."33 In fact, "[the Good and First Principle] possesses nothing: it will 
therefore have no intellection."34 Following upon the lack of consciousness of 
the One, and upon the fact that knowledge comes from an illumination of the 
lower by the higher, "awareness of this Principle comes neither by knowing nor 
by the Intellection that discovers the Intellectual Beings but by a presence 
overpassing all knowledge. In knowing, soul or mind abandons its unity .... 
Our way then takes us beyond knowing .... "35 At this supreme stage, what 
takes place is, in effect, communion of a dehumanized soul with a first princi-
ple totally devoid of personal character. 
Here again, Plotinus' and John of the Cross' formulations are unrecogniz-
able to one another. Regarding the question as to whether there is conscious-
ness in mystical union, the Carmelite thinker stresses that the term of the 
ascent is the crystal-clear vision of beatitude, the highest mystical stage attain-
able in this life being a foretaste, a prelude. This being so, as a cognitive act it 
is not clear; but it is not dark either, as is the mystical night. Standing between 
the two extremes, it is "a tranquil night, at the onset of the rise of dawn."36 
The ray of contemplation is described as "a serene and limpid light,"37 by 
means of which "God communicates to the soul certain half-obscure glimpses 
of His divine beauty .... "38 And further, in that transfiguring union it is said 
that the subject discovers God's infinite attributes, referred to in the Living 
Flame as "lamps of fire" which "give forth knowledge and love of God," 
enlightening and enkindling the soul "within their splendors." 39 
Much unlike Plotinus, Juan de la Cruz sees the virtues as performing a 
pivotal role at the apex of mystical communion. As stated earlier, the feat of 
communion with God is not accomplished by the unaided strength of the 
subject, nor by the natural capacities of one's rational powers, but by the 
theological virtues which perfect the latter and infuse into them the life of 
God. The virtue of hope purifies the memory of its natural contents. The 
virtue of faith perfects the intellect, bringing it to attain God cognitively. And 
the virtue of charity perfects the will, enabling it to perform a proportionate 
act of love. The theological virtues are so indispensable and so intimately 
involved that they themselves can be looked upon as the bond of union. Their 
function is, in tum, linked with the trinitarian character of John of the Cross' 
mysticism; and here we are at the antipode of cold Neoplatonic impersonal-
ism. By the virtue of faith the soul comes to share in the Divine Intellect; that 
is, to participate in the act of generation of the Son by the Father. By the 
virtue of charity, the subject shares in God's own Act of Love, which is one and 
the same as the spiration of the Holy Spirit. The third theological virtue, 
hope, is correlated in union with the divine nature in a generic way. Thus, 
mystical communion is an indwelling of the Trinity in the soul "enlightening its 
intellect in the wisdom of the Son, delighting its will in the Holy Spirit, and 
absorbing it powerfully and mightily in the abysmal embrace of the sweetness 
of the Father."4o 
We can conclude our exploratory remarks by pointing out that while Ploti-
nus and John of the Cross can both be legitimately looked upon as mystics, we 
are dealing here with two very heterogeneous realities. On the one hand we 
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have the learned, serene, impassible pagan sage, wrapped up in the mystical 
contemplation of ever simpler metaphysical realities; on the other, the austere 
friar, learned but unreliant upon his erudition, on fire with divine love, trans-
figured by charity, his senses often suspended in rapture. There are unques-
tionably traces of Plotinus' magnificent schema in the thought of John of the 
Cross. But they are not much more than traces. After all, the historical 
transmission from the one to the other was not direct. It took place by way of 
Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite, who had received the Neoplatonic heritage 
from the Athenian Pl'oclus, within whose elaborate framework he inserted 
Christian doctrine. It is Dionysius and St. Augustine, along with a number of 
Franciscan mystics influenced by both of them, who represent the direct Neo-
platonic influences on John of the Cross. Thus it was that the latter received a 
Ncoplatonic legacy which had undergone several phases of Christianization. 
The result of this distance, in combination with numerous other factors, is that 
there is a substantial difference between the two modes of living and concep-
tualizing mysticism. Based on this difference, we may look upon Plotinus, 
without in any way wishing to minimize the awesomeness of his figure, as a 
"Prince of Natural Mysticism," in contrast to St. John of the Cross, who can 
unequivocally be termed a "Prince of Christian and Supernatural Mysticism." 
Elizabeth Wilhelnuen 
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